

**Oral Statement of Capt. Tim Canoll, President, Air Line Pilots Association International  
Before the  
Subcommittee on Transportation Security  
of the  
Committee on Homeland Security  
U.S. House of Representatives**

**July 16, 2015**

**“Examining the Federal Air Marshal Service and Its Readiness to Meet the Evolving Threat”**

*As prepared for delivery*

Good morning, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and members of the subcommittee. I am Captain Tim Canoll, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International. ALPA represents more than 52,000 pilots who fly for 31 passenger and all-cargo airlines in the United States and Canada. Thank you for inviting me here today.

For several decades, ALPA pilots have had a strong relationship with the Federal Air Marshal Service. ALPA leaders meet on a regular basis with the FAMs to ensure that we have the most current and accurate understanding of their roles, responsibilities, training, and methods. We focus in particular on learning how FAMs interface with flightcrew members like me when we fly the line.

Throughout the FAM’s history, ALPA members have been deeply impressed by the professionalism of the individual air marshals and the dedication of the program’s leaders, including Assistant Administrator Allison. Every day, FAMs put their lives at risk to safeguard the passengers and crewmembers on their flights. For that, ALPA and its members are and will always be extremely grateful.

In ALPA’s view, flying U.S. airliners with highly trained anti-terrorism experts aboard is immensely valuable. These professionals are not only capable of defending the flight deck, they also serve as a powerful deterrent to anyone who might contemplate hijacking an airline flight. The TSA has adopted a risk-based security philosophy for many of its programs. The Federal Air Marshal Service embodies a risk-based approach to aviation security.

On this same theme, the Federal Flight Deck Officer program also serves as another critical layer of protection and contributes to a risk-based approach to security.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ALPA conceived of and advocated for the FFDO program, which became reality when Congress passed the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act in 2002. FFDOs are airline pilots who voluntarily undergo very thorough screening and training by the TSA. Once qualified, these individuals are then deputized before assuming responsibility for protecting the cockpit.

In the 12 years since the first FFDOs were deputized in 2003, thousands of pilots who fly for passenger and all-cargo airlines have volunteered to become FFDOs. They protect the cockpit on about one million flight segments each year. In addition, FFDOs volunteer their personal time to receive the training required to join the program and pay many of their own expenses.

FFDOs are the last line of defense in protecting the cockpit. Like FAMS, FFDOs provide passengers, cargo shippers, and flight crews with a critical additional layer of security.

ALPA applauds the many supporters of the FFDO program in Congress and particularly those who serve on this committee. We believe that the funding level agreed on by Congress is adequate now for the TSA to continue to train new FFDOs while providing the management and oversight required. The FFDO program is a successful, efficient, and effective program and should expand as necessary to meet our risk-based security objectives.

ALPA also commends the FFDO program's current oversight authority, the Office of Training and Workforce Engagement, for setting the stage for the program's continued success. The OTWE has given ALPA members the opportunity to observe the most current training methods and procedures and to provide airline pilots' perspectives. OTWE has been very responsive to ALPA's feedback. We look forward to continuing to work closely with them.

Finally, since we are focused on the overall security of airline operations, I would be remiss if I did not underscore ALPA's strong support for installing secondary cockpit barriers on passenger airliners as another essential layer of security.

I would be pleased to discuss the details of how they work for interested subcommittee members. Simply put, secondary cockpit barriers create a common-sense additional layer of security by protecting the cockpit when the hardened door must be opened.

Installing secondary cockpit barriers on passenger airliners would be an important security enhancement for many reasons, not the least of which is that FAMS and FFDOs would benefit from this additional layer of security as part of a multi-layered proactive strategy.

At ALPA, we are committed to advancing aviation security to protect our passengers, our cargo, and our flight crews. We appreciate this subcommittee's shared interest in exploring new ways to make a secure air transportation system even more secure. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.