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Leveling the Playing Field
for U.S. Airlines and Their Employees
Introduction
The United States’ airline industry and its employees
operate in a hypercompetitive international marketplace. The
U.S. airline industry has lost $53 billion since 1999, on a
net basis. Only three years out of the last ten have been
profitable. This is an industry that has been unable to meet
its cost of capital and is known for not generating healthy
margins, even in the best of times. It is very clear that
the airline industry continues to face significant
challenges. Competition from foreign airlines, which are
often state owned or heavily state sponsored and vertically
integrated, and operate from countries with low or
nonexistent tax and regulatory burdens, is growing rapidly
and impeding international growth for U.S. airlines. In
addition, foreign airlines are expanding into markets
previously dominated by U.S. airlines, threatening our
carriers in their own backyard. U.S. airlines, as a result,
find themselves in survival mode, adapting to the global
marketplace that presents an uneven playing field for U.S.
airlines.
Around the world, the expansion of airlines like Emirates
and others with similar business models threaten U.S.
carriers on international routes. Many foreign carriers do
not encounter tax and regulatory burdens like by U.S.
airlines. The current taxes and fees the U.S. airline
industry endures are higher than nearly every other industry
in the United States, adding to the financial burden on the
airlines and the traveling public.
Today, the commercial airline industry leads all others
in America with 17 unique taxes and fees from the federal
government, resulting in 20 percent or more of the total
airline ticket prices going to taxes. These taxes discourage
commercial flying in the United States. Further, the
tendency of the U.S. government to emphasize consumer
interests at the expense of the financial viability of the
industry has resulted in a series of passenger protection
regulations that place a significant financial burden on
U.S. airlines, exacerbating the cost disadvantages that U.S.
carriers face in the international marketplace.
As taxes and regulatory burdens increase, airline revenue
decreases. Given the record losses that U.S. airlines have
experienced, this burden is only making the industry weaker
and limiting its ability to thrive, thus having an adverse
effect on employment and the careers of professional pilots.
Another advantage that foreign carriers have is their
ability to buy new American-manufactured airplanes with
below-market financing rates subsidized by U.S. taxpayers,
and then use those same airplanes to compete against U.S.
carriers on international routes with significantly lower
capital costs.
This paper explores and offers policy solutions to create
a better business environment for U.S. airlines and level
the playing field in the international marketplace. Issues
explored as ways to level the playing field for U.S.
airlines and their employees include:
• the problem of excessive oil
speculation;
• the low barriers to entry for
new carriers, which can lead to undercapitalized and
ill-prepared airlines that distort pricing before going out
of business;
• the customer experience at the
airport;
• the positive impact of tourism
on U.S. airlines;
• and investment in NextGen.
Further, while the United States has historically led the
world in setting aviation safety and security standards,
much of the rest of the world is not keeping up with our
high standards. When our excellent safety and security
standards are not adopted by foreign competitors, U.S.
carriers are left at a competitive disadvantage, and
international air safety and security as a whole is
compromised. This paper offers concrete actions to be taken
through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
the international standards-setting body chartered through
the United Nations, to level the playing field
internationally with respect to airline safety and security.
The United States’ airline industry’s extreme financial
volatility, numerous bankruptcies and airline shutdowns,
extensive employee pay concessions, pension termination, job
losses, and eroding infrastructure require that immediate
and aggressive action be taken to change course and
establish a road map for future industry and employee
success. Given the strong competitive cost advantages of
many foreign carriers, it is important that the U.S.
government promotes a business environment at home that
allows a fair opportunity for U.S. carriers to compete and
prevail in the international marketplace. U.S. airlines and
their employees can compete and win in the international
marketplace, but to do so they need to compete on a level
playing field. This paper offers a guide for getting there.
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Section 1: Enhancing the Business Environment in the
United States
Given the strong competitive advantages that key
state-owned foreign carriers have through vertical
integration with their government, it is important that the
U.S. government provides U.S. airlines and their employees a
business environment at home that allows them a fair
opportunity to compete and prevail in the international
marketplace.
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Promote Taxation Policy That Fosters the Airline
Industry’s Viability and Growth
The U.S. airline industry finds itself increasingly
burdened with higher taxes and fees. Today, the aviation
industry leads all others in America with 17 unique taxes
and fees from the federal government. Airlines for America
(“A4A,” formerly the Air Transport Association of America)
estimates a $300 ticket for a typical, domestic round-trip
itinerary with a single connection in both directions, is
taxed about 20 percent of the total ticket price. The
federal tax rates paid by airlines are higher than federal
“sin” taxes paid on alcohol, tobacco, and firearms, which
were originally intended to discourage use. Federal aviation
tax policy discourages the use of commercial air
transportation and impedes the industry’s ability to grow
and expand the U.S. economy.
As taxes increase, airlines must either pass them along
to consumers in the form of higher fares or expect to see
their revenue decrease. In a pricing environment that is
highly volatile and subject to competitive response and
public outcry, this often is not possible. Given the record
losses airlines have experienced, this tax burden is only
making the industry weaker and limiting its ability to
thrive, directly affecting employment and the careers of
professional pilots and other airline employees.
Furthermore, the tax burden is anticipated to increase in
the coming years. Twice recently, first as part of a
proposal to reduce the federal budget deficit and then again
as a part of the executive branch’s 2013 budget proposal,
the administration proposed a $100 per departure tax on
every flight and proposed to triple the passenger security
tax. Imposition of these additional taxes would have been
devastating to an industry that is still trying to recover
from years of losses. New or increased tax burdens on
commercial aviation, which is already disproportionately
taxed, threatens jobs in an industry that helps carry our
economy. Airline fares cannot always simply increase to
offset new taxes. New taxes, therefore, could lead to a
reduction of service by airlines. Small communities could be
particularly hard-hit, as service reductions often begin in
less-profitable small and rural communities. This could have
a direct impact on jobs, with airlines’ reduced service
bringing about a reduction in workforce.
In 2010, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Future of
Aviation Advisory Committee (FAAC), which was appointed to
develop recommendations on initiatives that would be of
particular importance to the future health and
sustainability of the industry, highlighted the heavy tax
burden borne by aviation. The FAAC noted that not only did
this tax burden make travel and shipping less affordable,
but also could very well inhibit airlines from making needed
investments to achieve sustained profitability and
competitiveness. The FAAC recommended commissioning an
independent study to evaluate the federal aviation tax
burden on passengers, airlines, and general aviation. The
results of this evaluation could be used to pursue
appropriate legislative and regulatory actions consistent
with the findings of the study.
Unfortunately, the DOT is still “exploring options to
conduct the study”—more than a year after the FAAC issued
its recommendations.
Policy Recommendation: The current structure of the
industry’s taxes and fees needs to be reviewed and reformed
to help make the industry financially sound and competitive
in the international marketplace. Policy makers should
strive to reform our aviation tax policy with a goal of
leveling the playing field and increasing U.S. international
competitiveness and advancing U.S. leadership in aviation
safety.
The DOT should immediately conduct the FAAC-recommended
independent study to evaluate the federal aviation tax
burden on passengers, airlines, and general aviation. The
results of this study should then be used as the basis for
pursuing appropriate legislative and regulatory actions to
reform aviation taxes in a way that will promote U.S.
international competitiveness and advance U.S. leadership in
aviation safety. In the interim, all new or increased
proposed fees and taxes on the airline industry should be
rejected.
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Reform “Passenger Protection” Regulations
Since December 2009, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) has promulgated a series of costly
consumer rights protections for passengers. ALPA is
committed to providing the flying public with a positive
travel experience. The vast majority of the DOT’s new
consumer rights regulations, however, are misguided and
provide little, if any, benefit to passengers. In a November
2011 study, the American Aviation Institute (AAI) found that
new DOT passenger protection regulations and resulting
enforcement actions cost airlines more than $1.7
billion—over four times the amount of last year’s U.S.
airline industry profits. With more than $50 billion in
losses over the last decade, skyrocketing jet fuel costs,
and a 0.3 percent profit margin in 2011—which amounts to
three cents in profit for every $10 in revenue—the rising
burden of such regulations is undermining the U.S. airline
industry’s ability to compete globally, become sustainably
profitable, and expand its U.S. workforce.
The first set of rules, formally titled “Enhancing
Airline Passenger Protections,” were proposed in 2009 and
took effect in April 2010 (74 Fed. Reg. 68983-01, Docket No.
DOT-OST-2007-0022). A costly and burdensome element of the
requirements, the so-called “tarmac delay rule,” requires
airlines to publish contingency plans to provide food and
water to passengers after a two-hour tarmac delay, and allow
passengers on domestic flights to deplane after a three-hour
tarmac delay. Unfortunately, the rule does not address the
many root causes for tarmac delays, most of which are beyond
an airline’s control, including inclement weather, air
traffic control delays and technical problems, airport gate
availability, inadequate customs and immigration staffing
levels, and runway or taxiway closures.
According to a September 2011 study by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), while the tarmac
delay rule has nearly eliminated delays of more than three
hours, the likelihood of cancellation increases with the
time a plane stays on the tarmac. GAO found that airlines
were 24 percent more likely to cancel a flight before
leaving the gate during the most delay-prone months of the
year. By simply fining airlines up to $27,500 per passenger
for noncompliance with the rule instead of seeking to
address the root cause of tarmac delays, the GAO found that
DOT has effectively changed airline decision making to make
cancellations more likely. According to AAI, the tarmac
delay portion of the rule will cost airlines $250 million
annually. This is not a positive outcome for passengers,
airlines, airline workers, and the overall U.S. economy.
DOT issued a second set of rules, commonly known as
“Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections II” (76 Fed. Reg.
23110-01, DOT-OST-2010-0140), in April 2011. These rules
purport to increase transparency and remove sources of
confusion for consumers by requiring airlines to (1) provide
more frequent flight status notifications; (2) include
federal taxes and fees in their advertised fares (commonly
known as the Full-Fare Advertising rule); (3) provide
enhanced denied boarding compensation to passengers; (4)
stop post-purchase ancillary fee changes; (5) allow
passengers to hold a reservation without payment for 24
hours; and (6) apply a modified set of tarmac delay
requirements to foreign carriers. Notably, the cost and
burden of tarmac delay compliance falls disproportionately
on U.S. carriers versus foreign carriers, since U.S.
carriers operate many more U.S. flights than foreign
carriers do.
One of the most costly and troublesome components of the
rule is the Full-Fare Advertising requirement. AAI argues
that this requirement forces airlines to display the
worst-case scenario for the taxes and fees that may apply to
any possible routing for a trip before a passenger or travel
agent has selected the routing to be flown (such display
changes are costly to implement as well). Thus, according to
AAI, the requirement makes the advertised price of a ticket
artificially higher, which will dampen demand. Another part
of the requirement stipulates that those taxes and fees not
be displayed more prominently than the fare (which also
involves costly reworking of displayed information), and
thus masks the federal aviation tax burden. That burden has
doubled over the last two decades to over 20 percent of the
total ticket cost—putting airline tickets in the same tax
bracket as alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. In this respect,
the “Full-Fare Advertising” rule provides no consumer
benefit and imposes enormous new costs on
airlines—approximately $108 million in direct compliance
costs and $10.2 billion in lost revenue from dampened
demand—spanning 2011 to 2021, according to AAI.
Later this year, DOT is expected to issue a third set of
passenger protection rules that would require airlines to
report revenue information related to 19 separate items,
including how much they collect for meals, drinks, and
upgrades. In no other industry is this required. DOT may
also require airlines to make all of their products
available through global distribution systems—for free. The
third passenger protection rule, combined with the
aforementioned rules, represents unwarranted government
intervention in airline business practices. U.S. airlines
and their workers simply cannot afford the billions in
additional costs that these rules would impose.
Policy Recommendation: The U.S. government should place a
moratorium on new consumer regulations (except for
safety-related rules) until DOT conducts a review of
existing protections, submits its findings for peer review
by neutral academic experts, and collects information from
airlines about the cost of compliance. In conducting its
review of existing consumer regulations, and when
considering new consumer regulations, DOT should give
greater weight to the economic impact the rule will have on
U.S. airlines and their workers rather than focus
exclusively on the impact on consumers.
It is not in the public interest to further impose
financial burdens on an already beleaguered industry.
Instead, the government should work together with industry
and labor to develop collaborative solutions that tackle the
root causes of problems.
Accordingly, when applying the “public interest” test, DOT
should carefully consider all of the public interest factors
specified in the aviation statutes and seek to promote a
financially stable industry that benefits U.S. workers and
service to communities. As DOT has acknowledged, “matters
that maintain and improve the health of the aviation
industry,” including encouraging airlines to “earn adequate
profits and attract capital,” are in the public interest.
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Reform Aviation Financing at the Export-Import Bank
ALPA supports the mission of the Export-Import Bank
(Bank). ALPA is pro-U.S. manufacturing and wants the Bank to
continue to finance export deals that make sense for
American workers. Some of the transactions the Bank is
undertaking related to wide-body aircraft financing,
however, are having unintended consequences, including the
loss of U.S. pilot and other airline jobs and job
opportunities in the international marketplace. The
Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 is a step in
the right direction to reforming the Bank, and
implementation of the reforms must be executed rapidly and
effectively. However, still more needs to be done to ensure
U.S. aviation jobs are not jeopardized by Bank financing.
During the past five years, the Bank has provided
financing for dozens of wide-body aircraft to foreign
airlines. This financing is provided at rates and terms that
are not available to U.S. airlines, and many of these
Bank-subsidized wide-body aircraft are being used on routes
that are, have been, and could be served by U.S. airlines.
U.S. carriers have found that they have needed to withdraw
from or not enter routes that might otherwise be
economically viable.
The effect on U.S. pilot and airline worker jobs has been
significant. In response to the increase in seat capacity
directly attributable to aircraft financing from the Bank to
foreign airlines, domestic airlines have been forced to
reduce capacity by nearly 2 percent, resulting in the loss
of approximately 7,500 U.S. airline jobs. Given the amount
of financing the Bank has provided foreign carriers ($34.5
billion in financing from 2005 to 2010 and another $11.4
billion in 2011 alone) and intends to provide in the future,
the potential for further incursion into U.S. airline market
share by these carriers using Bank-funded aircraft could
result in significant loss of U.S. airline worker jobs. Each
airline job supports some 36 jobs outside the aviation
industry, so each U.S. job lost has a significant negative
ripple on the broader U.S. economy. ALPA has joined with A4A
in a lawsuit challenging the Bank’s proposed financing of
787 and 777 Boeing aircraft for Air India, making the case
that the Bank failed to undertake the required economic and
job impact study required by the Bank’s charter.
Policy Recommendation: As directed by Congress in the
Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012, which was
signed by the president on May 30, 2012, the administration
should immediately enter into negotiations with the European
countries with export credit agencies that support Airbus
aircraft sales in order to eliminate export credit agency
financing of all wide-body aircraft. We continue to support
a robust manufacturing sector in our economy, and we are
confident that there are many transactions that can be
financed that would not negatively impact U.S. workers. We
do not expect the Bank to unilaterally disarm in the
wide-body aircraft subsidy back-and-forth with Europe;
however, both sides have an incentive to wind down this
financing. Bank senior vice president for transportation,
Robert Morin, said as much in March 2012 when talking about
aircraft loans, stating: “Clearly it’s not healthy in the
long term for export credit agencies to be doing so much.”
Congress has mandated that the Bank undertake an economic
effects analysis of potential financings to ensure that,
with respect to each transaction, the impact of wide-body
aircraft financing for foreign carriers is in fact a net
positive for U.S. industry and employees. If the required
economic impact analysis reveals that a financing deal would
result in a net negative impact on U.S. jobs, then the
rational and congressionally mandated outcome is that the
transaction should not be supported by U.S. taxpayers.
In the 2012 reauthorization act, Congress requires the
Bank to operate in a more transparent fashion and provide an
opportunity for the public and affected interests, including
airlines and their employees, to review and comment on
proposed airline financing deals in advance of their
approval. To date, the process by which the Bank has
reviewed and approved financing has not been transparent;
there has been virtually no opportunity for an interested or
potentially affected entity such as ALPA to have meaningful
input into that process. Economic impact studies, which are
required by Congress, should be done on every proposed
wide-body aircraft financing deal beforehand to ensure that
the impact on U.S. jobs is actually positive, and not just
assumed to be so. This is consistent with the Bank’s
congressional charter. Congress requires the Bank to support
foreign purchasers only after taking “full consideration” of
“any serious adverse effect” that particular exports, such
as aircraft, might have on other U.S. companies and their
employees. 12 U.S.C. §§ 635(b)(1)(B), 635a-2; see also
id. § 635(e)(1). The 2012 Bank Reauthorization Act
requires 25 days of public notice of pending transactions;
the provision of more information on those transactions;
and, most important, allows for public comment to the Bank’s
Board of Directors on all proposed transactions by
interested parties like ALPA. This transparency is essential
to ensure full consideration of any adverse effect Bank
financing may have on U.S. industry and employment.
Finally, the reauthorization act requires the Bank to
develop and publish “methodological” guidelines for
conducting economic impact analyses. The Bank’s method for
calculating its impact on U.S. jobs is also to be critiqued
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Further, the
administration, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are to work together on
new methodologies for economic and job impact studies. These
analyses should be the cornerstone of the Bank’s financing
decisions as they should reveal whether these financing
decisions actually put U.S. taxpayer dollars to work for
American workers.
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Strengthen New Entrant Requirements for Start-Up Airlines
The combination of relatively low barriers to entry, the
availability of capital, and the ability to reach and sell
products to consumers via the Internet has made it much
easier for start-up airlines to enter the airline industry.
This has led to new entrants that have been undercapitalized
and ill-prepared to execute long-term business plans. These
carriers have had a dramatic effect on industry pricing and
have forced their established competitors to price
irrationally in order to stay in the market. Over time,
these new entrants have gone out of business, but their
irrational pricing practices have left the industry in worse
financial condition as they have forced other carriers to
cut prices at the expense of profitability. Since
deregulation, more than 200 air carriers have come and/or
gone.
DOT should not be lax with new entrant requirements. New
entrants should be required to be financially sound and to
have well-thought-out business plans. Between 2000 and 2010,
there were 50 bankruptcy filings by U.S. air carriers, with
29 of those carriers ceasing operations. An average of 12
percent of U.S. carriers’ capacity was associated with a
bankruptcy between 2000 and 2009, with a high of 32 percent
in 2005. With AMR’s recent bankruptcy filing and the
nation’s economic slowdown, it is clear that this industry
is not yet on its way to sustained profitability.
Many communities have been hurt when new entrants have
gone out of business. Skybus, for example, began service out
of Columbus, Ohio, in May 2007, and less than a year later
shut down. During that time, Skybus was beset with a myriad
of operational problems and economic challenges. Despite its
unsustainable business model, the airline kept fares at $10
and was forced to cancel routes within five months of
starting service. Once Skybus failed, Columbus no longer had
a large carrier serving multiple destinations, and the
company’s former competitors were left with bruised balance
sheets as a result of its disastrous pricing policy.
Policy Recommendation: The DOT should look to strengthen
its requirements for new entrants. These requirements should
set higher standards of viability for financial wherewithal
(i.e., proper capitalization) and require that new entrant
applicants have sound business plans.
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Reduce Speculation in the Oil Market and Other
Derivatives
Fuel is often the largest and certainly the most volatile
expense item for the airline industry. Dramatic price swings
have added significant stress to an already-beleaguered
industry and make long-term planning almost impossible. In
today’s marketplace, the price of oil is increasingly driven
by speculators, not by producers and consumers of oil.
In the last decade, the level of speculative trading in
crude oil futures contracts on the New York Mercantile
Exchange has risen by 600 percent. According to the
Congressional Research Service, during 2008, the cost of oil
doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80
percent. In early 2011, there was a run-up of about 20
percent, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. At the
same, gasoline prices have skyrocketed from $1.56 per gallon
to more than $3.65 per gallon, increasing costs for airlines
and other industries. An analysis by Deutsche Bank estimates
that every penny increase in jet fuel prices on an
annualized basis equals additional fuel expense of $170
million for the U.S. airline industry. In turn, these costs
are passed on to consumers or drive businesses into debt, or
worse, bankruptcy.
Pilots have seen firsthand the destructive effect that
oil speculation can have on the airline industry. Given what
the airline industry already endured at the beginning of the
decade, the oil speculation bubble compounded the financial
woes of several airlines, forcing them to declare
bankruptcy, liquidate, and lay off thousands of airline
workers.
The U.S. government should increase oversight of and
reduce speculation in the derivatives market without
hindering legitimate hedging practices utilized by end
users, such as airlines.
Policy Recommendation: Congress should pass S. 1598, the
Anti-Excessive Speculation Act, which curbs oil speculation
while allowing legitimate hedging. The legislation would
clarify the Commodity Exchange Act to ensure that the
commodity markets “accurately reflect the fundamental supply
and demand for commodities.” It establishes the deterrence
and prevention of excessive speculation as an express
purpose of the act, while also defining “excessive
speculation” to allow legal interpretation. Importantly, the
legislation also establishes individual statutory
speculative position limits for energy futures, options, and
economically similar contracts, wherever they are traded (on
exchange or over the counter). The position limits would be
set at 5 percent of deliverable supply in the spot month and
5 percent of open interest in the out months. The
speculative position limits would not apply to bona fide
hedging transactions like those that airlines engage in. No
single trader could hold more than 5 percent of the oil
futures market, thereby greatly reducing the risk that any
trader will be able to corner, squeeze, or otherwise
manipulate oil and gas prices.
The legislation also establishes aggregate speculative
position limits in energy contracts that would apply to
speculators as a class of traders, capping the overall level
of speculation in the market at its historic 25-year
average. This would reduce oil speculation from about 45
percent of the total market to 20 percent of the market. The
aggregate speculative position limits would not apply to
bona fide hedging transactions from airlines and other
legitimate end users.
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Pursue Foreign Tourist Visa Liberalization
The income from foreign visitors in the United States is
counted as an export and can play a significant role in the
U.S. trade balance. The U.S. travel and tourism industry
represents 2.7 percent of GDP and approximately 7.5 million
U.S. jobs. Foreign travelers to the United States fly on
U.S. airplanes and help to support thousands of U.S. airline
jobs. Increasing foreign travel to the United States is a
tremendous growth market for U.S. airlines and their
employees.
China, in particular, is a growth market for travel to
the United States. Only 1 percent of all Chinese citizens
who travel abroad come to the United States. This is in
spite of the fact that, according to Air China, surveys show
that the United States is the preferred travel and return
destination for Chinese travelers. Additionally, according
to the Department of Commerce, Chinese and Brazilian
tourists currently spend upwards of $5,000 on average per
trip when in the United States.
Among the key factors depressing the number of foreign
travelers are U.S. visa procedures. For example, in China,
visa processing centers are located in only a few major
cities, and processing wait times have been deterrents to
potential travelers. There are steps that can be taken to
greatly facilitate the number of Chinese visa applications
that can be processed and approved to increase the flow of
Chinese business and tourist travelers to the United States.
The Obama administration recognizes the potential for
growth in travel and tourism to the United States, and
recently announced a plan to increase nonimmigrant secure
visa processing capacity in China and Brazil by 40 percent
in 2012. Further, the plan will ensure that 80 percent of
nonimmigrant visa applicants are interviewed within three
weeks of receipt of an application, a significant
improvement of the current prohibitive wait times.
Policy Recommendation: The U.S. government should promote
U.S. tourism abroad and facilitate the issuance of foreign
tourist visas. ALPA believes that President Obama’s
announced initiatives are an excellent first step toward
increasing the number of foreign visitors to the United
States. ALPA proposes a thorough GAO study and report to
Congress on recommendations from government agencies on
additional effective, expedient, and cost-efficient ways to
increase the number of visas that can be issued to potential
travelers from China.
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Enhance the Airline Customer Experience at the Airport
The airline industry’s health and sustainability relies,
in large measure, on creating and maintaining a positive
travel experience for the public from the moment they arrive
at the airport for departure until the time that they arrive
at their destination. Since the intrinsic value of air
travel is its ability to save customers time, the amount of
money that passengers will spend on airline tickets is
related to how much time is lost during security- and
customs-screening activities at the airport.
Air travel has become an increasingly complicated and
time-consuming mode of transportation, due in large measure
to certain security and customs-related procedures and
processes. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ushered in
a sea change for aviation security and passenger and cargo
screening. A new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were
established and assumed responsibility for these functions
from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the airline
industry in late 2001. As a result, much greater resources
and considerably more focus has been given to securing our
nation’s air travelers than at any time in the history of
the country.
A significant impediment to the travel experience can be
seen in the form of certain passenger-security-related
processes and procedures that may be viewed very negatively
by the majority of travelers. These can include long lines
and wait times, the need to remove articles of clothing,
loss of personal privacy, pat-downs by screening officers,
and use of advanced imaging technology equipment.
The United States’ philosophical approach and security
culture, much more than the types and amounts of resources
deployed, must adapt to today’s threat. Screening processes
need to continue to interdict harmful objects carried into
airports, but they also must be enhanced to do a much better
job of screening for individuals with hostile intent, and
they must do so in a manner that is acceptable to the vast
majority of air travelers.
Despite the fact that the threat has demonstrably changed
in recent years, the United States has yet to significantly
alter its decades-old screening methods to adapt to the new
danger. Current screening procedures are predicated on two
general assumptions: (1) every passenger poses an equal
threat, with limited exceptions, and (2) the primary focus
of screening is to identify objects that could be used to
harm individuals and/or the aircraft. As a result, when
terrorist tactics change or a different weapon or threat
object is used, the security system is reactively adjusted
to that new object or tactic. Over time, this inadequate
response to the problem has the effect of creating an
enormously costly patchwork of “Band-Aid” solutions.
In 2011, ALPA and A4A collaborated with TSA on the
development of a program called Known Crewmember (KCM) to
screen authorized airline personnel using available
technology and airline data. KCM is designed to confirm an
airline flightcrew member’s identity and current employment
status, expedite his or her access to sterile areas of
airports, reduce backlogs, increase throughput at
passenger-screening checkpoints, and make more efficient use
of TSA screening resources. It also is intended to enhance
security for the traveling public and the airline industry.
All of these benefits provide a win-win result for the
security of the traveling public and efficiencies for
airlines and their employees.
Professional airline pilots have successfully passed
in-depth preemployment background investigations; they have
been subjected to fingerprint-based criminal-history record
checks, and are the most highly screened employee group in
the aviation industry. Furthermore, pilots are on the front
line of our nation’s aviation security effort, not a threat
to it. KCM recognizes those facts by providing pilots with a
technologically modern and highly efficient alternative to
the traditional airport security screening process.
Much of the same information exists about some members of
the traveling public. In October 2011, TSA began a
risk-based passenger-screening process at several airports,
which is now being expanded to additional airports. Eligible
customers include frequent flyers from several major
airlines who are members of the Customs and Border
Protection’s (CBP) “trusted traveler” programs like Global
Entry and NEXUS. This program can be expanded to include
additional information. After opting in to the program,
passengers go through an expedited screening at select
checkpoints, keeping their shoes and light jackets on, their
laptops in their cases, and packed liquids in their carry-on
baggage.
Further, with respect to CBP clearance into the United
States for both citizens and visiting foreign nationals,
ALPA is concerned with the priorities of DHS and CBP. In
December 2011, DHS announced plans to establish a U.S.
Immigration Advisory Program at Abu Dhabi International
Airport as a first step toward the deployment of a passenger
preclearance program in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ALPA
opposes a preclearance site in the UAE.
CBP currently oversees preclearance sites at 15 foreign
locations that allow U.S.-bound air passengers to get
advance approval to enter the United States from established
locations in airports outside the country. These sites are
strategically located at airports where U.S. carriers
constitute a considerable amount of the air traffic (for
example, Dublin and Montreal) or all of the air service (as
is the case in Bermuda). The potential preclearance site in
the UAE would be a significant departure from this paradigm
and would put U.S. air carriers and U.S. airline worker jobs
at risk by advantaging foreign airline competitors
exclusively. In ALPA’s view, U.S. customs preclearance
should benefit U.S. citizens and facilitate travel on U.S.
airlines.
No U.S. carrier currently flies between the Abu Dhabi
airport and the United States. The only carrier with such
service is Etihad Airways, the state-owned national airline
of the United Arab Emirates. A preclearance site in Abu
Dhabi would benefit only Etihad, which is already benefiting
from numerous advantages over U.S. airlines, such as freedom
from local taxes, the absence of transparency requirements
with respect to corporate finances, and the ability to
purchase wide-body aircraft from Boeing and Airbus at
reduced rates through export credit agencies. ALPA opposes a
preclearance site in the UAE for these reasons.
Policy Recommendation: A large amount of information is
known about individuals who travel by air. The government
should increase investment in the Known Crewmember and
trusted traveler programs, which enhance security and reduce
airport wait times for all customers, improving the airline
customer experience.
The government should shift its resources to focus
greater attention on identifying those very few persons who
pose a threat to air travel instead of continuing a
one-size-fits-all approach. Our security screening
philosophy must be altered to embrace two fundamental
principles: (1) the vast majority of passengers pose little
or no risk to the safety and security of flight, and (2) the
best means of providing genuine security is to positively
identify known, no- and low-risk passengers, process them in
an expeditious manner, and concentrate our finite,
high-technology, and behavioral screening resources on the
small percentage of passengers whose perceived risk is
unknown or creates the need for additional screening
measures. Such a proactive security system will defeat the
terrorists by anticipating future threats, be much more
effective and efficient than current security protocols, and
reduce security-related inconvenience and delays for the
vast majority of the traveling public while protecting
passenger privacy to the maximum practical extent.
Further, DHS should abandon any plans to open a
preclearance facility in the UAE, or any country where U.S.
carriers do not do at least a majority of the flying.
Congress should prohibit DHS from spending any funds on
preclearance facilities where U.S. carriers are not doing at
least a majority of the flying and should continue to
prohibit DHS from accepting independent funding of
preclearance facilities from any third parties, including
cities, countries, and carriers.
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Invest in NextGen to Improve Safety and Increase
Efficiencies While Decreasing Costs to Airlines
To maintain a competitive advantage in the international
marketplace, the United States’ national airspace system
(NAS)—which is composed of the entire air- and ground-based
infrastructure, including air traffic control surveillance
and communication, navigation, airports, aircraft, vehicles
on the surface, and others—must be modernized. The current
system of air traffic control and air traffic management is
based on technologies, techniques, and processes that date
back decades. The infrastructure continues to deteriorate,
and the ability of the FAA and operators in the NAS to
guarantee the safest possible travel is similarly being
diminished.
Existing and emerging technologies hold the promise of
significant increases in the ability to maintain or improve
levels of safety while improving capacity and efficiency of
our system, allowing our airlines to grow and ultimately
save costs, resulting in a better business environment and
more level playing field for U.S. airlines.
NextGen, in its mature state, will improve efficiency of
operations, enhance both the accuracy and coverage of
controllers’ ability to pinpoint the position of aircraft in
flight and on the ground, increase capacity, reduce delays
in the air and on the ground, and cut down greenhouse gas
emissions. With the rising cost of fuel, less fuel will be
consumed, resulting in immediate cost savings. Reduced taxi
and flight time also translates into less noise and
emissions. Better knowledge of exactly where the aircraft is
on the ground translates into more efficient gate
management, reduced tarmac delays, and fewer runway
incursions. More accurate airborne position knowledge will
allow the air traffic controller to arrange aircraft into
more efficient streams. All of these benefits lead to
profitability and growth of our airlines and our nation’s
economy, as well as a better customer experience.
The upgrade from the current outdated system to a modern,
more efficient one is as complex as the technologies
themselves. It is simply impossible to “turn off” the
current system while changes are made. Every major upgrade
to the system must be undertaken while the system is in full
operation, with the existing workforce. Thus, development of
equipment and procedures, acquisition and deployment
strategies, and training for pilots, controllers, and
technicians must all be fully integrated.
Policy Recommendation: The U.S. government can help level
the playing field for U.S. airlines and their employees by
investing in NextGen to promote greater safety and
efficiency.
The administration and Congress must work to accelerate
the FAA’s NextGen plan. The scope, duration, and cost of
NextGen require that decisions on critical aspects, such as
funding and equipage, must be timely, accurate, and focused
on the overall needs of the public. Strong government
leadership, consistent long-term funding, and cooperative
planning are all needed in establishing standards and
requiring minimum levels of equipage.
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NextGen Taxes
While most aviation taxes go toward maintaining the
aviation infrastructure in this country, some of the taxes
also go toward developing and implementing technologies and
procedures that lead to NextGen. U.S. airlines actually get
“taxed” twice for NextGen, paying taxes on fuel, tickets,
landing fees, and incurring numerous other fees, while also
bearing the cost to install mandated technologies on their
aircraft that will result in NextGen.
NextGen benefits all users of the national airspace
system, not just airlines. Ironically, the most immediate
economic benefit of many of these technologies, ADS-B for
example, is to reduce the cost to the federal government to
operate the national airspace system. ADS-B implementation
enables the government to shift away from a ground-based
surveillance infrastructure to a satellite-based system.
This significantly reduces the cost burden on the government
to maintain antiquated ground-based radar systems.
Policy Recommendation: Because the savings of NextGen
investments by the airlines benefit the federal government
at the front end, these savings should be passed to the
airlines in the form of grants, tax credits, subsidies, or
other incentives to encourage aircraft equipage.
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Section 2: Defending U.S. Aviation Jobs in the
International Marketplace
The United States’ airline industry’s extreme financial
volatility, numerous bankruptcies and airline shutdowns,
extensive employee pay concessions, pension terminations,
job losses, and eroding infrastructure require that
immediate and aggressive action be taken to change course
and establish a road map for future industry and employee
success. In order to secure U.S. jobs in the international
marketplace, in addition to creating a better business
environment at home as set forth in Section 1, the United
States also needs to champion airline workers directly
through the enforcement of existing labor laws that are
designed to safeguard U.S. workers. In cases where the U.S.
labor market is exposed by government action, such as Open
Skies agreements, the government must provide safeguards for
U.S. workers.
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Include Labor Safeguards in Air Transport Service
Agreements
Since 1993, the United States has had a policy of
pursuing Open Skies agreements with almost all of its
trading partners and now has more than 100 such agreements
in place. While some labor concerns, such as cabotage (the
transport of local traffic between two points in the same
country by an airline of a foreign country), foreign
ownership, and seventh freedom passenger rights (the right
to carry passengers between two foreign countries without
any continuing service to one’s own country), have been
taken into account by the U.S. government in its negotiating
policy, only the 2007 air services agreement with the
European Union, as amended, contains an express labor
article to safeguard U.S. aviation jobs.
In connection with the current effort of the United
States to obtain an Open Skies agreement with China, ALPA
has informed U.S. negotiators that the Association is
opposed to continuation of that effort until a neutral
entity undertakes a study of the potential effect of such an
agreement on U.S. airline labor. ALPA has also informed U.S.
negotiators that an Open Skies agreement with China should
include labor provisions that provide meaningful safeguards
and recourse to U.S. airline workers if the agreement
adversely affects them.
Policy Recommendation: Congress should monitor U.S. air
service negotiations to ensure that labor safeguard
provisions are included where appropriate.
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Safeguard U.S. Pilot Jobs in Connection with Joint
Venture Alliances
With the development of international joint ventures that
are afforded antitrust immunity, the U.S. government should
ensure U.S. airline flying is maintained and enhanced.
Currently, these joint ventures are structured so the
airline partners can act as single businesses with respect
to the services included in the Joint Venture. A U.S.
carrier may receive substantial revenue without performing
any flight operations of its own on the international routes
included in the Joint Venture. This can lead to U.S. airline
workers getting only a small portion—or even none—of the
international flying operated under the joint venture. This
can have a negative impact on the overall competitiveness of
U.S. airlines, as they may stagnate while their foreign
partners grow. These agreements should generate flying
opportunities for U.S. carriers and jobs for their workers
and not result in the outsourcing of U.S. flying and U.S.
jobs.
Policy Recommendation: Congress should take up and pass
legislation ensuring that there be a close correlation
between the portion of revenue a U.S. airline receives from
a revenue-sharing arrangement that involves international
air transport services and the amount of actual flying the
airline itself engages in as part of that agreement. In the
111th Congress, H.R. 4788 was introduced in the House of
Representatives. If enacted, that bill would have linked the
portion of joint venture revenue that a U.S. airline could
receive to the portion of joint venture flying done by the
airline. The bill also would have required U.S. airlines to
seek DOT approval of joint venture agreements and would have
applied to all joint ventures, whether approved before or
after the date of enactment.
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Maintain Current Foreign Ownership Restrictions
Laws governing ownership of U.S. airlines are rooted in
basic security considerations, in particular the need to
ensure that U.S. air carrier aircraft are available in times
of national emergency. These rules also address a key
concern of U.S. airline employees—that they receive a fair
share of international flying opportunities. It is quite
possible that foreign ownership of U.S. carriers would
result in the loss of flying opportunities for U.S. carriers
and their workers should foreign air carriers allocate
growth opportunities to their own workers as opposed to
those of the U.S. carrier in which they would have a stake.
Further, it is a very real concern that foreign ownership
could result in U.S. carriers being largely controlled by
foreign interests that are intent on turning those carriers
into feeder operations for foreign airlines. For years, ALPA
has opposed any modification of foreign ownership or control
limitations.
Additionally, ALPA remains concerned about proposals put
forward in the past by the U.S. government to allow for
third-country ownership and control of foreign airlines.
ALPA believes that the United States should retain the right
to object on a case-by-case basis to particular ownership
structures of airlines that wish to serve the United States.
Policy Recommendation: Maintain the current foreign
ownership and control restrictions in the United States. No
action is therefore needed by the U.S. government on this
issue beyond defense of the current law.
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Maintain Current Cabotage Restrictions
The United States has by far the largest domestic traffic
market of any country. Allowing foreign air carriers to
conduct cabotage operations—the transport of local traffic
between two points in the same country by an airline of
another country for compensation—would permit them to
operate flights in this market in direct competition with
U.S. carriers. This would be contrary to the basic U.S.
employment policy altogether, as no other industry permits
foreign companies to operate in the U.S. domestic market
with workers who are subject to the labor laws of that
company’s home country. During the U.S.–European Union air
service negotiations between 2003 and 2010, the EU sought to
include an exchange of cabotage rights in a new U.S.–EU
agreement. Other negotiating partners have also from time to
time proposed an exchange of cabotage rights with the United
States. To date, the U.S. government has firmly rejected
these proposals.
Foreign carrier cabotage is prohibited by the U.S.
aviation statutes, and ALPA has consistently and strongly
opposed efforts to modify the prohibition.
Policy Recommendation: Maintain the current cabotage
restrictions in the United States. No action is therefore
needed by the U.S. government on this issue beyond defense
of the current law.
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Restore Fairness in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code for Airline
Employees
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
many airline workers’ pay, working conditions, pensions, and
living standards—built over decades of collective
bargaining—were lost in the bankruptcy process. Airline
workers made deep, repeated, and lasting sacrifices,
carrying far more than their fair share of the pain to save
their airlines. At the same time, these long-term sacrifices
by employees have often exceeded those necessary for the
immediate economic survival of the airlines. The stark fact
that many unionized airline employees have lost more than a
third of their pay and their decades-old pension benefits
and continue to be locked into lengthy court-imposed or
pressured concessionary terms, while other stakeholders have
not been required to make comparable sacrifices and airlines
have since resumed profitability, demonstrates that the
current bankruptcy process has swung seriously out of
balance for airline workers.
These unfortunate results have occurred through the
Section 1113 procedures of Title 11 of the bankruptcy code,
which is the mechanism employers use to seek judicial
permission to void collectively bargained obligations to
their employees and impose, in their place, dictated pay and
working conditions. The Section 1113 provisions were
designed to recognize that some changes in employee working
conditions may be needed to address an employer’s economic
crisis, while providing a basic level of protection to
employees’ binding labor agreements so that they could not
be easily set aside in the bankruptcy process.
Recent court decisions, however, have misapplied Section
1113 far from its intent to void long-standing working
conditions without due regard for the legitimate economic
security of airline employees and their families. Indeed,
some of these erroneous court decisions have held airline
employees to standards no other creditors are made to
endure—unlike other creditors, airline employees have been
told that their binding labor agreements are not breached if
they are voided in the 1113 process, calling into question
the ability of employees to receive fair compensation for
the breach of their agreements, and these workers are also
told by the courts that, unlike other creditors, they cannot
withhold their services if their agreements are breached and
set aside. The result is that the application of the 1113
process has shifted far from its original intent, and is no
longer fairly balancing the economic survival of a business
with the basic economic security of employees.
Policy Recommendation: Congress must act to overhaul the
Section 1113 process and return it to its original intent of
providing a fair process to balance the need for economic
restructuring for distressed employers with basic safeguards
for workers’ vested interests by tightening the standards
for voiding contractual obligations to workers, ensuring
fair treatment and equitable sacrifices for all stakeholders
in the bankruptcy process, and making explicit that
employees have the right to seek damages or withhold their
services in response to an abrogation of their collective
bargaining agreements, which are rights that all other
creditors have. All of these changes are needed to restore
some semblance of a level playing field for airline
employees in today’s volatile economic environment.
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Section 3: Enhancing International Aviation Safety
Regulations through ICAO
Historically, the United States has led the world in
setting aviation safety and security standards. Problems
arise when the safety and security field is not level, and
foreign airlines do not keep up with the United States’ high
standards. When the United States’ excellent safety and
security standards are not adopted by foreign competitors,
U.S. carriers are left at a competitive disadvantage, and
international air safety and security as a whole are
compromised.
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Work with ICAO to Help Raise the Safety and Security Bar
Internationally
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
an international standards-setting body chartered through
the United Nations. While not a regulatory body, its
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) are expected to
be used by the 191 member nations (which are referred to as
“States”) as minima in developing their own aviation
regulatory standards and advisory materials. States are
expected to inform ICAO of noncompliance with its standards,
but ICAO has no means of directly enforcing States’
adherence to standards. Many developing States use the ICAO
standards as their own body of aviation regulations, making
the ICAO guidance the de facto “minimum acceptable standard”
worldwide.
Although there is an intrinsic benefit in higher safety
and security standards, States with aviation safety and
security regulations more restrictive than those of the ICAO,
such as those of the United States, run the risk of being at
an economic disadvantage since manufacturing, operating, and
infrastructure costs may be driven up by the need to comply
with the higher standards. It is thus in the United States’
best interest, both in economic terms and from the
standpoint of a safer global aviation system, to endeavor to
continually influence the development of ICAO standards
using U.S. regulations as a baseline.
ALPA is able to influence ICAO standards through our
membership in the International Federation of Air Line
Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) and through participation in
the development of positions of the U.S. and Canadian
delegations to the ICAO Assembly. Establishing higher ICAO
standards than exist in U.S. federal aviation regulations
can prompt the U.S. government to meet those standards. In
key areas of interest to ALPA, therefore, it is advantageous
to concurrently influence the development of improved
aviation safety and security standards within U.S. federal
regulations and ICAO standards.
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Flight/Duty Time Requirements
ALPA views the establishment of improved flight and duty
rules as among the most important flight safety undertakings
in modern times. Recently, the U.S. government published a
final rule on flight/duty time regulations for passenger
carrying airlines, FAR 117, which will implement much-needed
and long-awaited safety improvements over the next two
years. The new rule is a significant improvement over the
antiquated rules established five decades ago.
Unfortunately, cargo operations were not included in the new
pilot fatigue rule. For decades, ALPA has demanded “One
Level of Safety” for the simple reason that fatigue affects
all pilots. All safety regulations should follow suit.
Policy Recommendation: Congress should direct the FAA to
amend FAR 117, the pilot fatigue rule, to include cargo
operations under the same fatigue standards as those of
passenger airlines.
Further, the United States should pursue a vigorous
effort at ICAO to adopt a new international standard for
flight/duty time that will increase aviation safety around
the globe and create a level playing field for U.S. airlines
that compete globally. The rule should cover all airline
operations and be based on FAR 117.
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Pilot Training, Licensing, Mentoring, and Screening
The best and most important safety feature on any
airplane is a well-trained, highly motivated, professional
pilot. Despite great advances in aircraft technology that
have immeasurably improved safety, the flight crew is still
responsible for making hundreds of decisions on each and
every flight in order to operate in the safest manner
possible.
Flying today’s complex airline aircraft in very congested
and complicated airspace is a challenging undertaking, even
for experienced pilots. Yet around the world, entry-level
pilots hired by airlines over the past few years generally
have less experience than pilots hired in prior years. In
some cases, pilots barely meet the qualifications and
competencies established as the accepted minimums for
commercial pilots.
Because fewer experienced pilots are available for hire,
many States have implemented training programs designed to
produce pilots in a short period of time, with virtually no
experience. In addition, many airlines have lowered their
minimum hiring requirements. In some cases, the hiring
requirements have been lowered to the minimum allowable to
acquire a commercial pilot license.
Recent accidents in the United States have led Congress and
FAA to recognize the inherent shortcomings in today’s
training regulations. Numerous Aviation Rulemaking
Committees met in 2010–2011 and developed many
recommendations that the FAA is presently compiling into a
proposed rulemaking to amend the flight training, screening,
and mentoring requirements of the next generation of airline
pilots, as mandated by the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2011 (P.L.
111-216). ICAO has taken a strong interest in this subject as well. It
convened a symposium in early 2010 on this subject in
Montreal and has been actively involved in the development
of new training program concepts and standards.
Policy Recommendation: The United States should pursue a
vigorous
effort at ICAO to adopt new international standards for
pilot flight training, screening, and mentoring around the
globe.
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Carriage of Hazardous Materials Including Bulk Shipments of
Lithium Batteries
ALPA has long advocated for improved transport requirements
for hazardous materials. Shipments of lithium-ion and
lithium-metal batteries aboard aircraft are currently the
most pressing hazmat issue that the aviation community needs
to address. Lithium batteries are more volatile than many
goods that are currently shipped as hazmat; they can
self-ignite when damaged, defective, or exposed to a heat
source. They also burn incredibly hot, and FAA testing has
shown that fires involving lithium-metal batteries are
unresponsive to halon, the traditional extinguishing agent
used aboard aircraft.
The United States has proactively banned the shipment of
lithium-metal batteries on passenger aircraft. Despite the
same risk that these batteries pose on cargo aircraft,
lithium metal is still allowed on all-cargo aircraft. At
this time, lithium-ion and lithium-metal batteries are
exempt from many federal hazardous material regulations,
such as the requirement to place a dangerous goods label on
the package, the requirement to notify the pilot-in-command
of their presence, the requirement for airline personnel to
perform an acceptance check of the package, or any of the
cargo compartment quantity limitations normally applied to
hazardous materials. Further, there is no international
prohibition on the shipment of lithium-metal batteries.
In January 2010, the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), in consultation with the
Federal Aviation Administration, issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend requirements in the Hazardous
Materials Regulations on the transportation of lithium cells
and batteries, including lithium cells and batteries packed
with or contained in equipment. Considerable opposition to
that NPRM was raised by several manufacturers and shipper
organizations, which led to a legislative limit on federal
regulations on lithium batteries in the FAA reauthorization
bill of 2012. This provision in the FAA reauthorization law (P.L. 112-95)
makes it difficult to pass and implement any federal
regulation on the shipment of lithium-metal or lithium-ion
batteries (except the current metal ban on passenger
aircraft) that is more stringent than the standards set by
ICAO. There are exceptions if there is a “credible report”
from a national or international governmental regulatory or
investigating body that lithium batteries substantially
contributed to an onboard fire resulting in a safety
incident.
ALPA has been working through ICAO’s Dangerous Goods Panel
to improve international technical instructions for shipment
of lithium batteries for more than a decade. Significant
progress was made recently when the Dangerous Goods Panel
recommended that ICAO apply dangerous goods safety standards
in the areas of labeling, training, inspection, and pilot
notification to shipments of lithium batteries by air. ICAO
is expected to publish these new technical instructions by
January 2013.
While these ICAO technical instructions mark critical
progress, much remains to be done to apply “One Level of
Safety” to enhance the safety of shipping lithium batteries
on aircraft here in the United States.
Policy Recommendation: The United States should classify the
bulk shipment of lithium batteries as a hazardous material,
applying all appropriate hazardous materials regulations.
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Mandate SMS and FRMS
A safety management system (SMS) is a proactive safety
program that makes use of voluntarily provided incident data
and reports from frontline employees that give the operator
notice of accident precursors. When SMS is implemented
properly, greater safety and operational efficiencies
result. ICAO standards stipulate that States shall, as of November
2009, require that airline and airport operators implement
SMS in order to (1) identify safety hazards, (2) ensure that
remedial action necessary to maintain an acceptable level of
safety is implemented, (3) provide for continuous monitoring
and regular assessment of the safety level achieved, and (4)
aim to make continuous improvements to the overall level of
safety. As of this writing, the United States is not in full
compliance with this standard.
A fatigue risk management system (FRMS) supplements
prescribed flight- and duty-time regulations and other
validated, independent, scientific, research-based software
tools by applying SMS principles and processes to
proactively and continuously manage fatigue risk through a
partnership approach involving management and crewmembers.
The purpose of an FRMS is to ensure that flightcrew members
are sufficiently alert so that they can operate to a
satisfactory level of performance and safety under all
circumstances. In June 2011, ICAO adopted proposals to amend Annex 6 to
include revised and new requirements for pilot fatigue
management. The new standards became effective December 2011
and include the use of FRMS as one means of mitigating the
risk of fatigue.
Despite the fact that SMS and FRMS are contained in ICAO
standards, States’ acceptance and implementation of these
standards have been irregular at best. In the United States,
most airline operators have a considerable amount of work to
do to create both programs on their respective properties.
Policy Recommendation: The United States should advocate
adoption of FRMS and SMS for all aspects of aviation:
aircraft design, operations, airports, air traffic,
maintenance practices, etc.
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Installation of Flight Deck Secondary Barriers
Reinforced cockpit doors mandated on passenger aircraft by
Congress after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have
added a valuable layer of protection to airliner flight
decks. Experience has proven, however, that the doors do not
provide a complete solution to the problem they were
intended to resolve.
A secondary barrier, accompanied by standardized procedures
for protecting the cockpit door when opened in flight, would
significantly augment the fortified door and add an
important layer of security to prevent hostile takeover of
the cockpit. The secondary barrier is located on the cabin
side of the fortified flight deck door and improves security
by guarding the flight deck when the door is open. It can
also indicate a person’s intentions to breach the flight
deck before he or she reaches the fortified flight deck
door.
Since there is not yet a requirement for a fortified flight
deck door on all cargo-only aircraft, the same device that
is used as a secondary barrier on passenger airliners can
provide a relatively low-cost security enhancement on
cargo-only aircraft until such time as a fortified door
requirement is made applicable to all airline aircraft.
In 2008, ALPA persuaded the U.S. government and airline
industry to support the development of performance standards
for secondary barriers. These standards were completed in
mid-2011 through a consensus-building federal advisory
committee and can now be used by airline operators for
implementation. Some U.S. operators have voluntarily
installed secondary barriers.
Policy Recommendation: The U.S. government should pursue an
ICAO standard for secondary barriers on all commercial
aircraft to increase security of flight decks on aircraft
operated around the world.
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Establishing Global Carbon Emissions Levels
Every State is concerned about the potential effect on the
climate caused by greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide in
particular, as a result of burning jet fuel. To this end,
the European Union has created an emissions trading scheme (ETS),
which is a unilaterally imposed scheme that charges airlines
for their aviation carbon emissions into and out of the EU.
This ETS has been the target of much criticism by States
around the world.
It is ALPA’s view that the ETS is in contravention of the
Chicago Convention and violates the basic principles of
State sovereignty set forth in that convention and the
relevant provisions of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. More than 20 countries with
large aviation sectors have adopted a declaration opposing
the inclusion in the ETS of flights by non-EU airlines into
and out of the EU and have urged the EU to work
collaboratively with the rest of the international community
to address aviation emissions.
Further, just as with the UK Environmental Departure Fee,
there is no requirement that ETS receipts be applied toward
mitigating climate change or decreasing aircraft emissions
through technological innovation of equipment or fuel.
In December 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and
Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood sent a letter to
their EU counterparts rebuking the unilateral action of the
EU ETS and strongly urged them to work through the ICAO
process.
Further, the United States is currently working with China,
Russia, and India on a strategy to counter the unilateral
action taken by the EU. China has already stated that it
will not allow Chinese airlines to participate in the EU ETS
and has delayed large orders of Airbus aircraft, sparking
tension over a potential trade war. India has quietly
instructed its airlines not to participate and Russia has
threatened to close its airspace to EU carriers. Dozens of
other countries have expressed concern, including some EU
countries. The EU ETS will hinder the U.S. airline industry’s ability
to reduce carbon emissions. Presently, the only feasible way
U.S. carriers can decrease fuel burn and subsequent
emissions is through investment in more efficient aircraft
and engines. The EU ETS decreases U.S. carriers’ ability to
invest in such technology. According to the International
Air Transport Association the EU ETS could erode airline
industry profits, already very marginal, by more than 30
percent. This significant decrease in profits will hinder
U.S. airlines’ ability to invest in new, more fuel-efficient
aircraft. Policy Recommendation: The U.S. government should file an
Article 84 action at ICAO and work with ICAO to establish a
global carbon emissions-limitation methodology that
decreases pollution while maintaining airline
sustainability. The Senate should immediately pass S. 1956,
which authorizes the secretary of transportation to prohibit
U.S. airlines from taking part in the EU ETS. Both efforts
will demonstrate to the EU that it must eliminate the ETS
and get to work on a real solution through ICAO.
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