Don the Mask!
August
6, 2014 - “Smoke in the Cockpit—When Seconds Matter” was the
subject of a panel chaired by Capt. Bill de Groh (Envoy),
ALPA Aircraft Design and Operations (ADO) Group chair. The
panel of experts examined what steps the airline industry
and regulators are taking to ensure that cockpit emergency
equipment standards are adequate for today’s onboard smoke
and fire threats.
Capt. David Lawrence, senior
air safety investigator, Operational Factors Division, NTSB,
was a member of the full NTSB Go Team that participated in
the ICAO Annex 13 investigation of the crash of UPS Flight
6, a B-747-400F that suffered an inflight fire in September
2010 and went down while trying to return to Dubai.
Lawrence said that
investigations of actual accidents such as befell UPS Flight
6 have shown that, in real life, “the smoke is black, sooty,
toxic, completely debilitating in the cockpit—not the wispy,
white theatrical smoke you might see in a sim if your sim
even has that.”
He declared, “The time has
come” to provide all airline pilots with full-face masks,
noting, “I cannot [over]emphasize [that] you don’t have that
much time; seconds count, and you only have one chance to
get it right.”
Lawrence added, “You need to
train to use the audio panel with the mask on. Also, do you
know how the vent works, to vent your goggles?”
Gus Sarkos, manager of the
FAA’s Fire Safety Branch, listed a number of improvements to
aircraft design and certification requirements made over the
years to prevent or slow onboard fires. However, he
acknowledged, some of these improvements have been
retrofitted to aircraft already flying, others have only
been required on new production aircraft, and others have
only been applied to new type certificates.
Sarkos reported that his group
has research underway, to be completed next year, to set
more stringent requirements for the ducting and wiring of
future aircraft designs. Another FAA project is looking at
smoke and heat sensors to lower the false alarm rate,
discriminate non-fire smoke and odor events (e.g., hydraulic
leaks), detect and locate fires in hidden areas, and provide
earlier detection.
The FAA has a “monumental”
study of all annunciated smoke/fire events in the works,
Sarkos added. The database of some 16,000 events, examined
for 24 parameters, is to be completed by next spring and
will be available to the public.
Capt. Boomer Bombardi (Delta),
ALPA smoke, fire, and fumes subject-matter expert, praised
Sarkos and his group at the FAA Technical Center as “unsung
heroes,” noting that the researchers have conducted—and
continue to conduct—much important research on aircraft fire
safety but do not make policy.
After multiple B-757 cockpit
events involving smoking or arcing windscreen heaters
revealed that the crew oxygen masks in that airplane were
too short to allow pilots easy access to the cockpit fire
extinguisher while wearing the mask, ALPA asked the FAA for
an interpretation of the requirement that emergency
equipment be “readily accessible.” In November 2008,
Bombardi said, the agency responded that it agreed with
ALPA’s view that the fire extinguisher must be “readily
accessible” from the pilots’ normal seated position, “but
the oxygen hoses still haven’t been lengthened,” Bombardi
observed.
Capt. William Reed, safety
pilot, Flight Operations, Boeing Test and Evaluation,
responded to Capt. Bombardi’s concern noting that
lengthening the oxygen hose is a difficult undertaking
because of tight space in the flight deck and redesign
complexity. Reed further stated that, “We are emotionally
involved with our products and our customers. We take safety
very seriously. We fly our airplanes every week.”
Reed discussed his company’s
involvement on the group of about 100 industry experts who,
after the Swissair Flight 111 tragedy, worked together to
develop revised smoke/fire/fumes checklists for pilots that
put added emphasis on considering the need for an immediate
diversion as soon as they detect smoke, fire, and/or fumes.
Bombardi praised Boeing for actively changing the checklists
for all Boeing aircraft types as a result of that
industrywide initiative.
Citing examples, such as
Boeing’s decision to discontinue using a certain type of
wiring in 1993, Reed said, “We try to get out ahead of new
regulations and bring new technology to bear.”
Bolstering the call for
continued collaboration, de Groh declared, “This is a team
effort—manufacturers, regulators, operators, and us.
Don’t forget us.” |