Don the Mask!

August 6, 2014 - “Smoke in the Cockpit—When Seconds Matter” was the subject of a panel chaired by Capt. Bill de Groh (Envoy), ALPA Aircraft Design and Operations (ADO) Group chair. The panel of experts examined what steps the airline industry and regulators are taking to ensure that cockpit emergency equipment standards are adequate for today’s onboard smoke and fire threats.

Capt. David Lawrence, senior air safety investigator, Operational Factors Division, NTSB, was a member of the full NTSB Go Team that participated in the ICAO Annex 13 investigation of the crash of UPS Flight 6, a B-747-400F that suffered an inflight fire in September 2010 and went down while trying to return to Dubai.

Lawrence said that investigations of actual accidents such as befell UPS Flight 6 have shown that, in real life, “the smoke is black, sooty, toxic, completely debilitating in the cockpit—not the wispy, white theatrical smoke you might see in a sim if your sim even has that.”

He declared, “The time has come” to provide all airline pilots with full-face masks, noting, “I cannot [over]emphasize [that] you don’t have that much time; seconds count, and you only have one chance to get it right.”

Lawrence added, “You need to train to use the audio panel with the mask on. Also, do you know how the vent works, to vent your goggles?”

Gus Sarkos, manager of the FAA’s Fire Safety Branch, listed a number of improvements to aircraft design and certification requirements made over the years to prevent or slow onboard fires. However, he acknowledged, some of these improvements have been retrofitted to aircraft already flying, others have only been required on new production aircraft, and others have only been applied to new type certificates.

Sarkos reported that his group has research underway, to be completed next year, to set more stringent requirements for the ducting and wiring of future aircraft designs. Another FAA project is looking at smoke and heat sensors to lower the false alarm rate, discriminate non-fire smoke and odor events (e.g., hydraulic leaks), detect and locate fires in hidden areas, and provide earlier detection.

The FAA has a “monumental” study of all annunciated smoke/fire events in the works, Sarkos added. The database of some 16,000 events, examined for 24 parameters, is to be completed by next spring and will be available to the public.

Capt. Boomer Bombardi (Delta), ALPA smoke, fire, and fumes subject-matter expert, praised Sarkos and his group at the FAA Technical Center as “unsung heroes,” noting that the researchers have conducted—and continue to conduct—much important research on aircraft fire safety but do not make policy.

After multiple B-757 cockpit events involving smoking or arcing windscreen heaters revealed that the crew oxygen masks in that airplane were too short to allow pilots easy access to the cockpit fire extinguisher while wearing the mask, ALPA asked the FAA for an interpretation of the requirement that emergency equipment be “readily accessible.” In November 2008, Bombardi said, the agency responded that it agreed with ALPA’s view that the fire extinguisher must be “readily accessible” from the pilots’ normal seated position, “but the oxygen hoses still haven’t been lengthened,” Bombardi observed.

Capt. William Reed, safety pilot, Flight Operations, Boeing Test and Evaluation, responded to Capt. Bombardi’s concern noting that lengthening the oxygen hose is a difficult undertaking because of tight space in the flight deck and redesign complexity. Reed further stated that, “We are emotionally involved with our products and our customers. We take safety very seriously. We fly our airplanes every week.”

Reed discussed his company’s involvement on the group of about 100 industry experts who, after the Swissair Flight 111 tragedy, worked together to develop revised smoke/fire/fumes checklists for pilots that put added emphasis on considering the need for an immediate diversion as soon as they detect smoke, fire, and/or fumes. Bombardi praised Boeing for actively changing the checklists for all Boeing aircraft types as a result of that industrywide initiative.

Citing examples, such as Boeing’s decision to discontinue using a certain type of wiring in 1993, Reed said, “We try to get out ahead of new regulations and bring new technology to bear.”

Bolstering the call for continued collaboration, de Groh declared, “This is a team effort—manufacturers, regulators, operators, and us. Don’t forget us.”