STATEMENT OF

CAPTAIN LEE MOAK, PRESIDENT
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, DC

DECEMBER 10, 2014

“U.S. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
INTEGRATION, OVERSIGHT, AND COMPETITIVENESS”
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Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am Captain Lee Moak, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA). ALPA represents over 51,000 pilots who fly for 30 passenger and all-cargo airlines in the United States and Canada. On behalf of our members, I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide our perspectives on the critical importance of safely integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the most complex airspace in the world which is enabled for air transportation by the people, equipment, and procedures of the National Airspace System (NAS). The NAS is the most dynamic and diverse such system in the world and it must be protected and maintained to the best of our ability to deliver the safest, most efficient air transportation services in the world.

Introduction and Capabilities of UAS/RPA

The need to modernize aviation extends beyond simply upgrading today’s ground and airborne equipment. Among the most dramatic and challenging revolutions in aviation technology and operational capability to be introduced into the NAS is the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) some of which are more appropriately called Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). UAS/RPAS include aircraft that range in size from as small as a bird to as large as a Boeing 737, along with a wide range of technology on the ground that forms the entire system that must be considered in evaluating the safety of integrating these aircraft into the National Airspace System.

Some UAS aircraft are operated completely autonomous in that their flight route is completely computer programmed and the device operates without a “pilot in the loop”. Other UAS aircraft, RPA aircraft, are flown remotely by pilots from an operational center or control stations that can be located at the launch and recovery site or thousands of miles away. UAS is a broader descriptor and includes both autonomous and RPA aircraft. Pilots/operators are not currently required by Federal Aviation Regulations to be FAA-licensed or qualified as pilots or even have a common
level of proficiency. In fact, in many cases, these operators are recruited from recreational modeling. Most of the current larger designs were developed for the Department of Defense (DOD) for use in combat areas and are not necessarily designed, built, maintained, or able to safely interoperate with other civil users in the same manner as other aircraft in the National Airspace System. As a result, today they are typically flown in segregated airspace, i.e., military restricted airspace or equivalent, but these UAS have demonstrated over and over again that they may potentially stray out of their assigned airspace in the event of a malfunction.

The UAS/RPAS may be used to perform flight operations that may expose more risk for a human to accomplish reliably and repeatedly in potentially austere environments. The uniqueness of UAS/RPAS operations has revealed many safety and technological challenges to be addressed before integration in order to maintain the current level of safety for the NAS, its users, and the travelling public. The introduction of small and large UAS to the NAS has become the most challenging enterprise for the FAA and the aviation community in many years. UAS proponents have a growing interest in expediting access to the NAS as evidenced by an increase in the number and scope of UAS flights in our busy NAS.

FAA has identified research and development efforts to be conducted at six specific test sites. Other operations in restricted capacities have been authorized in remote or segregated areas of the NAS. However, as the drumbeat to integrate the UAS/RPA as quickly as possible grows louder, many current and future-state technological issues raise yet-unanswered questions about the ability of these UAS/RPAS to safely interoperate with today’s certified aircraft in the NAS.

Until comprehensive end-to-end solutions are developed and promulgated by FAA, our overarching position is that no unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft, public or civil, should be allowed unrestricted access to conduct flight operations into the NAS unless it meets all of the high standards currently required for every other airspace user. This means UAS/RPA must be designed to interoperate, with similar performance and functional requirements at the heart of their system, architectures embodying state-of-the-art safety technologies and system redundancies as required by currently certified commercial and general aviation airspace users. Of particular importance and concern is the ability of commercial passenger carrying aircraft operating in the NAS to be able to see and avoid UAS and RPAS aircraft that may be operating in the same area.

We believe that the fundamental functions of operating the aircraft in a safe manner must be maintained at the same level of safety regardless of the location of the pilot or levels of automation. At the center of current commercial aviation flight operations is a well-trained, well-qualified professional pilot, and a well-qualified pilot remains the single most important safety component of any commercial aircraft. A UAS/RPAS should be able to operate as a part of commercial or general aviation, as the case may be, through compliance with FAA regulations and accompanying certification standards to meet the target level of safety that is performed reliably and repeatedly by well-trained airline pilots and their aircraft in the NAS today. Accordingly, UAS/RPA operators performing commercial or “For Hire” operations should be required to meet all the certification
and equivalent safety requirements of a commercial operator and the pilots flying the aircraft must meet equivalent training, qualification, and licensing requirements of pilots of manned aircraft in the same airspace.

**Harmonization of UAS/RPA Platforms**

UAS/RPA aircraft themselves are necessarily part of a larger system that includes the supporting ground station or control station, along with the command and control communications system which may employ a wide range of ground- or space-based elements.

Development of a common description of the UAS/RPA remains an unresolved technical issue with different interpretations either by country, regulatory body, or the media when described in publications. The main point of contention is that an Unmanned Aircraft System is not truly unmanned in today’s context; more accurately, it is an aircraft operated and managed by a pilot-in-command in a cockpit located in a ground station. So, while the term UAS sounds more autonomous or robotic, in reality, the FAA has stated that autonomous flights in the NAS are currently not authorized nor envisioned in the near term. A more apt description for these aircraft platforms and their support is the Remotely Piloted Aircraft System or RPAS for short, which is the accepted ICAO nomenclature. The term RPAS actually describes these platforms quite well, as the pilot is remotely located in the ground station but an integral part of the system. The FAA has representatives serving on international committees to harmonize the definitions, descriptions, procedures, and related documentation and we are optimistic that the FAA will begin the adoption of products from these groups to harmonize terminology with other regulatory organizations ongoing work efforts.

**UAS Design Standard Barriers**

The futuristic visions of unmanned operations promise possibilities and convenience that offers the attraction of a flying technology unbound from the conventions and constraints of modern aviation. The reality is quite different; new UAS/RPAS technology currently lack—but must have—the standardization of safely integrated and interoperable certified systems, which the FAA requires of commercial operators in the NAS today. Without mature standards, technologies without certification standards and regulations, safety in the NAS today would be significantly and negatively impacted, adding risk to commercial airline operations to an overburdened Air Traffic Control system.

There are UAS/RPAS proponents within government and industry who are insistent that within the next few years, UAS/RPAS should begin a much broader scope of civil commercial operations than is permitted today. Some proposals even advocate fully autonomous systems, that is, aircraft operations without pilots actively flying or commanding the aircraft (e.g., package delivery and survey) but individuals who merely monitor the end-to-end flight operation. At this time, the UAS/RPAS technologies, safety, certifications for an end-to-end solution for NAS integration are quite immature; patience, and more importantly collaboration, is needed to diligently examine all
the barriers and successfully develop comprehensive and fully mature solutions prior to widespread operational implementation into the NAS. We simply cannot afford to miss critical steps in safety analyses in an attempt to satisfy a market demand.

The introduction of multiple variations of UAS/RPAS without first completing architectural standards, analysis, rigorous testing, and robust aircraft and pilot certifications would impair aviation safety and the public’s perception of safe air travel. We believe that all aviation stakeholders should examine UAS/RPAS integration to determine how these RPA platforms may impact their operations.

Technological Barriers Impacting Operations in the NAS

American aviation technology is experiencing its own “space race” akin to the 1960s, with phenomenal growth in aviation science and technological advancements in this modern digital age, the results are testimony of the advanced applications underpinning NextGen and associated programs. These technologies are designed at their core architectures to be safe, reliable, and repeatable to provide the efficiencies required maintain the target level of safety as aviation transportation continues to grow. The target level of safety for commercial air travel in the NAS should be proactively, not reactively, protected. We are fully aware that there is a strong desire by UAS/RPAS operators, and those who wish to become operators, to begin flying in the NAS as quickly as possible. Clearly, there are commercial, social, business and international competitive advantages to a strong UAS industry. However, the government and industry must take a longer view of this present situation and ensure that robust UAS/RPAS are developed that completely integrate with commercial airline operations, and above all, do so safely. An imprudent rush to create and implement minimum standards will not only harm safety, but potentially produce a setback for the future expansion of UAS/RPAS operations for years to come.

A June 20, 2014, newspaper article1 reported that 47 UAS/ RPA accidents involving U.S. military and federal agencies’ aircraft have occurred since 2001, which is a safety record that no commercial business or airline could survive. These federal institutions have the authority to self-certify the airworthiness of their own UAS/RPA which can involve modifying compliance with FAA certification standards to accommodate these agencies’ unique mission requirements. This latitude and difference in priorities relative to commercial aviation is likely a contributing factor to the number of UAS/RPA accidents.

As such, it is easily understood that without the FAA’s and other safety organizations’ experience and collective guidance in aviation safety, lesser airworthiness standards and certification procedures will produce greater UAS/RPA accident rates. Moreover, these accident rates expose the importance of developing civil standards tailored explicitly to UAS/RPA technologies, airworthiness, and related certifications through established civil procedures.

1 “When Drones Fall from the Sky,” Washington Post, June 20, 2014
Unlike their manned counterparts, a key system on a UAS/RPA is the Communication and Control System (C²). This is what allows the pilot to control the aircraft. The system transmits and receives command inputs (e.g., flight controls, navigation, aircraft status, and ATC communications) from the ground station via radio frequency to the UA/RPA. The criticality of the C² system becomes self-evident, as it is the most vital single-system link depended upon for the UAS/RPA to successfully and safely operate. Link failure—which is exactly analogous to the pilot of an aircraft suddenly disappearing from the cockpit—may cause a multitude of unintentional, cascading events. The sole dependence on this vital link is a necessary aspect of UAS/RPAS operations but its failure is one of the primary causal factors why UAS/RPA have accidents.

The primary C² contributing failures are associated with latency issues, that is, the time between transmission and reception of a command to successfully operate the UAS/RPA. Unlike the human on-board pilot, whose control input is instantaneous, latency times can be from 3 seconds to as much as 30 seconds, perhaps more. In the NAS, where immediate communication and required actions are expected to provide separation between aircraft, latency could cause more significant problems for Air Traffic Control (ATC) and manned aircraft in that airspace. The term “lost link,” as the phrase implies, is the result of the UAS/RPA having no communication or control whatsoever to successfully operate and command the UAS/RPA until C² two-way link is re-established, if that is accomplished.

The varying degrees of UAS/RPA C² vulnerabilities and failures creates complex safety issues for UAS integration. The C² data, voice, and video requirements placed on operating UAS/RPA using radio waves or satellite creates limitations that currently prevent UAS from performing to the safety level of manned commercial aircraft operations. If a UAS/RPA cannot maintain a C² link, the normal expectation of a UAS/RPA to perform the critical functions of ensuring separation from terrain, obstacles, and other aircraft, as well as collision avoidance responsibilities, will unduly place safety burdens on other NAS users. Since 1931, ALPA’s professional airline pilots and safety professionals have worked together to advocate for the safety of the NAS. Manned aircraft flown by pilots in the NAS today use Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) to take advantage of the benefits of FAA’s ATC separation services, however, a pilot’s responsibility to “See and Avoid” to remain well-clear of other aircraft is a constant responsibility in their line of work, regardless of who or what else is monitoring the flight. Simply stated, pilots visually scan the airspace, especially when traffic is being reported to them by ATC, to identify the aircraft in question when a traffic alert is initiated or simply when a flight crew is flying into an airport that may not have a control tower, to avoid all potential conflicts. The UAS/RPA needs to be equipped with the technological ability to maintain well-clear of and a avoid collision with other operators if it is to truly replicate the actions expected of every aircraft in the NAS.

A robust and safe UAS/RPA system design will not result in the transference of safety burdens—such as maintaining separation—for other operators and users to mitigate. Accordingly, one of the most important capabilities yet to be developed for UAS/RPA operations is the Detect and Avoid (DAA) technology that is fully capable of performing two primary functions, staying well-clear of
other aircraft and if that cannot be done, the ability to avoid an imminent collision. While those capabilities in manned aircraft are accomplished by a combination of pilot skill and electronic means, UAS must rely on electronic means. The responsibility to avoid coming hazardously close to other aircraft is a two-way street. In addition to the UAS/RPAS ability to detect and avoid other aircraft, other aircraft in the NAS must likewise be able to “see” any UAS/RPA that could pose a collision threat. Realistically, given sizes too small to be seen by the human eye until the aircraft is dangerously close, the ability to be seen must be electronic.

A promising system to enable that capability is called ACAS X. Unfortunately no funding exists to develop ACAS for UAS/RPAS to implement this groundbreaking technology. Specific funding for ACAS X would benefit manned and unmanned aircraft and play a vital role in the safe integration of UAS platforms into the NAS RPA’s and harmonize with NextGen requirements in the near future, as well.

**Government and Industry Initiatives**

FAA Reauthorization legislation was introduced and Congress passed the “FAA Modernization and Reform Act reauthorization of 2012” on February 14, 2012. However, the FAA anticipating the growing advocacy of UAS/RPAS expansion in the NAS stood up the UAS/RPAS Integration Office, AFS-80. In general, AFS-80’s purpose is to develop the overarching aviation coordination of UAS/RPAS integration standards, regulatory issues, certifications required for the aircraft and for the pilots who fly them, as well.

In Section 332 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2012, “Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into national airspace system,” the Act required the FAA to develop a comprehensive plan for integration of UAS/RPA into the NAS by September 2015. FAA is working hard on an integration plan, but has yet to release a long-awaited NPRM for small unmanned aircraft (sUAS). This delay has resulted in mounting pressure by the UAS industry to gain access to the NAS for commercial applications as evidenced by nearly 140 petitions for exemption under Section 333 of the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act. The UAS/RPA industry is focused on the much publicized military and domestic law enforcement UAS operations but, simultaneously, is rapidly moving forward on UAS many roles in civil applications.

Small UAS petitions for exemption under Section 333 are requesting exemption from several regulations in 14 CFR Parts 61 and 91, in order to perform operations in areas like film making, environmental surveying, infrastructure inspection, 3-dimensional map making, and agriculture applications. Without a small UAS/RPAS rule promulgated, operators file a petition to seek exemption from compliance with these regulations that the rest of the U.S. aviation community must be in compliance with every day. Proponents must, in their petitions for exemption, describe each and every means they intend to use to provide an equivalent level of safety. The FAA, in turn, if they grant the petition, must then check each and every operation for compliance with a set of requirements that is custom tailored for every operator. This need for FAA to react to the
legislated ability for proponents to request exemptions from multiple regulations taxes and already strained FAA oversight capability.

Even as designs and procedures are refined, these UAS/RPAS routinely fail. However, without quantitative failure data analyses, what components and how often failure occurs has not been made publically available. Small UAS/RPAS have failure conditions much like their larger brethren, C2 links, GPS, navigational and flight control failures appear to be quite common. Without robust standards, system architectures and redundant safety systems receiving certification through the FAA, the approved operators under Section 333 will certainly encounter failure conditions and create potential safety issues in the NAS. A significantly growing problem is unapproved small UAS/RPAS operations creating near mid-air collisions currently in the NAS also demonstrate why safety-based standards, certifications, and regulatory enforcement are required immediately to address this very serious potential safety problem.

The FAA has been challenged in completing a plan for integration that incorporates a complete set of standards development, rulemaking, certification and safety analyses to meet the September 2015 deadline required in the Act. We believe in order to guarantee an “equivalent level of safety” for UAS in the NAS, realistic timelines for safety and aviation technology studies, accompanied by stable sources of funding to identify all potential hazards and ways to mitigate those hazards, must be developed at a pace that does not compromise safety. As a result of these challenges, the FAA has chartered Aviation Rule-Making Committees (ARC) and tasked RTCA to create a Special Committees (SC), both of which play pivotal roles in standards, regulatory and policy development for many types of technological challenges in aviation.

Currently, the research and analysis work continues for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Communication and Control Links (C²). Technological dependencies and proposed architectures surrounding these systems lack maturity and do not yet meet the safety, performance, and functional requirements to operate reliably and repeatedly in an integrated and dynamic airspace of the current NAS.

Conclusions

The pressure for rapid integration into the NAS must not result in incomplete safety analyses or technologies prior to any authorization approvals to operate.
Standards and technologies for UAS/RPA must be in place to ensure the same high level of safety as is currently present in the NAS before a UAS/RPA can be authorized to occupy the same airspace as airlines, or operate in areas where UAS/RPA might inadvertently stray into airspace used by commercial flights.

Critical to safe UAS/RPA integration, the decisions being made about UAS/RPA airworthiness and operational requirements must fully address safety implications of UAS and complete interoperability functionalities (e.g., DAA) of UAS flying in, around, or over the same airspace as manned aircraft, and, perhaps more importantly, airline aircraft.

A well-trained and experienced commercial pilot is the most important safety component of the commercial aviation system. The role of the pilot is a major area of concern within the UAS/RPA and piloted aircraft communities. UAS/RPA operators using RC model pilots, non-licensed or private pilots for commercial or “For Hire” operations should not be allowed to operate UAS/RPAS in any commercial or “For Hire” operation. Another concern is that, by definition, it is impossible for a UAS/RPAS pilot to react to anything other than an explicitly annunciated malfunction. A pilot on board an aircraft can see, feel, smell, or hear many indications of an impending problem and begin to formulate a course of action before even sophisticated sensors and indicators provide positive indications of trouble. This capability is necessarily lost without a pilot on board, so the margin of safety it represents must be replace by other means. UAS/RPAS pilots should be highly trained, qualified, and monitored to meet the equivalent standards of pilots who operate manned aircraft in either private or commercial operations.

While many UAS/RPAS have preprogrammed instructions on which that aircraft relies in a lost link event, the fact that the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft when the aircraft is potentially near airspace occupied by other conventionally piloted aircraft is a safety concern. At present, no requirement exists to report all such events to a government agency (e.g., FAA or NTSB) so ALPA is concerned that the frequency of “lost link” with the UAS/RPAS is more prevalent than is currently being reported.

**Recommendations**

1. A comprehensive, proactive safety UAS/RPA program should incorporate technology standards, safety analyses, certifications, and flight standards to ensure that introduction of UAS/RPA into the NAS will not degrade the existing NAS Target Level of Safety.

2. Federal Aviation Regulations that specifically addresses UAS/RPA operators, operations, and pilots must be developed. Any UAS/RPA unique or UAS/RPA-specific regulations must be comparable and compatible with other existing regulations for other airspace users.

3. UAS/RPAS are inherently different aircraft from manned aircraft, and should be required to be equipped with safety-based technologies designed with “Well-Clear” and “Collision
Avoidance” functionalities at the heart of their system architectures, in order to maintain the current level of safety in the NAS.

4. Support FAA efforts to ensure that all the components of UAS/RPA certified by the Department of Defense and other government agencies do not adversely affect the NAS level of safety prior to their operating in other than segregated airspace.

5. Certification standards for UAS/RPA pilots must be commercially licensed with an instrument rating for the aircraft to be flown to ensure the continuity of safety that now exists in the NAS.

6. Regulatory directives containing certification standards, continuing airworthiness standards, and Minimum Equipment List requirements for UAS/RPA that are intended to operate in the NAS must be developed.

7. Congress should work with industry to develop an appropriate UAS/RPA integration funding mechanism within the FAA Reauthorization.

8. Any person or persons in direct control of a UAS/ RPAS must be limited to the control of a single aircraft unless operations are conducted in Special Use Airspace or FAA Certificate of Authorization.

9. The FAA’s limited resources will be significantly taxed without a stable source of funding for this purpose, combined with realistic timelines and a systematic approach that builds the path of integration based on proactive safety methodologies.

We appreciate the opportunity to testify on this important subject and look forward to working with Congress as it progresses.

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